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ABSTRACT 
 The world depends on the Suez Canal for ocean trade, and the United States 
maintains a presence in the Red Sea region to ensure open waters around the Cape of 
Hope. During Yemen's ongoing civil war, the Houthi movement has targeted the Saudi 
Arabia-led coalition, including U.S. Navy ships. This thesis explores whether the threat to 
the U.S. Navy and partners has increased and whether, as a result, CENTCOM's strategy 
needs to change to protect U.S. interests. The thesis examines U.S. grand strategy, 
CENTCOM strategy, the rise of the Houthi movement and its support from Iran, and the 
attacks on U.S. and partner ships. As the humanitarian crisis in Yemen worsens, this 
thesis finds that the maritime threat has also increased, creating a threat to both U.S. 
interests and global trade. U.S. leadership must consider a revised response. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Maritime transport through the Suez Canal currently accounts for over 7.5% of the 
world’s ocean trade.1 Although the U.S. Navy maintains a presence in the region, that 
presence has come under threat as a result of Yemen’s ongoing civil war; the Houthi 
movement in Yemen has targeted U.S. and partner maritime traffic off the coast of Yemen.2 
If the Houthis expand their hostilities toward maritime activity in the Red Sea, resulting in 
shipping routes being diverted around the Cape of Hope, the impact could be extremely 
devastating to the global economy. As the war in Yemen continues, the United States and 
coalition forces must ensure continued freedom and safety of navigation along Yemen’s 
coast. 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The Arab Spring in 2011 inspired the political uprising and civil unrest in Yemen 
today. Of all the states on the Arabian Peninsula, Yemen was one of the most affected by 
the Arab Spring.3 Since Yemen possesses high strategic interests for the United States, the 
U.S. military must examine how the civil war in Yemen has affected U.S. interests, 
strategy, and operations in the Arabian Peninsula. Particularly, how has the rise of Houthi 
power, backed by Iranian military assistance, impacted the maritime environment and U.S. 
naval operations along Yemen’s coasts? This thesis examines how the rise of insurgency 
within Yemen, primarily that of the Houthis, has affected U.S. and coalition maritime 
operations in the Red Sea region.  
                                                 
1 Egyptian Maritime Databank, “The Suez Canal: A Vital Shortcut for Global Commerce” (World 
Shipping Council, 2007), http://www.worldshipping.org/pdf/suez-canal-presentation.pdf. 
2 Shaul Shay and Rachel Liberman, The Red Sea Terror Triangle: Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, and Islamic 
Terror, 1st ed. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2007), 197–201. 
3 Marcel Serr, “Understanding the War in Yemen,” Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, (January 4, 
2018): 1–13, https://doi.org/10.1080/23739770.2017.1419405. 
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B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The insurgency in Yemen directly affects the maritime environment in the Red Sea 
region. The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) strategy may need to evolve to counter 
this growing threat. This thesis supports U.S. naval operations in the Red Sea region, and 
CENTCOM’s area of responsibility (AOR) more generally, by examining the impact of 
Yemen’s insurgency on U.S. and coalition maritime operations. Understanding the strategy 
and capabilities of insurgent groups within Yemen, particularly the Iran-backed Houthi, 
and how those factors have affected U.S. and coalition maritime operations, can help 
identify ways and means that U.S. and coalition maritime operations can adapt to better 
manage and counter the threats posed to the maritime environment. 
This thesis completes three main steps in its research to establish how and to what 
extent insurgent groups in Yemen have affected maritime operations in the Red Sea region. 
First, we identify the general pattern of U.S. and Coalition maritime operations, goals, and 
strategy in the greater Red Sea region and CENTCOM AOR. That general pattern serves 
as a baseline for measuring the relative impact of insurgent operations and attacks on U.S. 
and Coalition operations. Second, we establish the strategies, capabilities, and operational 
track record in the maritime domain for both the Houthis and AQAP. Third, we examine 
the role foreign actors have had in aiding those groups through materiel support and know-
how. By researching the maritime operations and capabilities of the Houthis and AQAP, 
and better understanding the role that outside states (primarily Iran) have had in providing 
materiel aid, we establish the present and potential future impact of these groups on the 
maritime environment. Knowing that impact allows us to identify areas of potential 
weakness in U.S. and coalition operations and provide recommendations that can improve 
maritime operations and strategy both in the greater Red Sea region and in the CENTCOM 
AOR. 
Understanding the success and failures of the U.S. and coalition maritime 
component in CENTCOM is essential to understanding the best strategy forward to thwart 
the threat of Yemen’s insurgency on maritime operations. The United States has 
established seapower in the Persian Gulf by utilizing a vast amount of its naval and political 
power. The U.S. commitment to assisting partner states in the region, as well as to 
3 
countering violent extremism, has been central to U.S. strategic interests in the CENTCOM 
AOR. Although insurgent organizations in Yemen pose a growing threat to U.S. and 
coalition naval activities, the issue has not seemed to gain much critical attention.  
 Generally, the historic role of the U.S. Navy has been to maintain the freedom of 
the sea. Continued safe and unrestricted maritime shipping and operations surrounding the 
Red Sea region is essential to the global economy, which directly affects U.S. and coalition 
economic interests. If threats from Yemen’s coast were to restrict maritime shipping and 
operations, the transit would divert to alternate sea lanes, which could dramatically increase 
the cost and time required to travel by sea. According to the Egyptian Maritime Databank 
(EMD), maritime vessels traveling from the Persian Gulf to London require fourteen days 
and travel a distance of 6400 nautical miles, if they utilize the Suez Canal.4 If travel through 
the Suez Canal is obstructed, the EMD assesses that having to navigate around the Cape of 
Good Hope would add over 5100 nautical miles and an additional ten days to voyages.5 
Both the Houthis and AQAP have already shown a willingness and ability to strike 
U.S. and coalition naval vessels and thus to challenge, and raise the cost of operations in, 
the maritime domain. Recent attacks by the Houthis against coalition vessels have proven 
that a very real and capable threat already exists and could increase.6 The strength of the 
Houthis has been attributed by the UN to training and provisions of military weapons from 
Iran.7  Such support has increased the sophistication of Houthi capabilities and might 
continue to do so through the near and medium terms. Therefore, understanding the threat 
in Yemen, what factors have allowed this threat to grow in sophistication, and how this 
threat has affected U.S. and coalition maritime operations, can provide information to 
better identify ways of improving U.S. and coalition maritime strategy and operations in 
the Red Sea region.  
                                                 
4 Egyptian Maritime Databank  
5 Egyptian Maritime Databank  
6 Jeremy Binnie, “Yemeni Rebels Threaten Red Sea Shipping,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, (January 
2018), http://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/Janes/Display/FG_719429-JDW. 
7 Binnie, “Yemeni Rebels Threaten Red Sea Shipping.” 
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The following literature review covers three relevant areas: major theories of U.S. 
grand strategy, Norman Cigar’s work on non-state actors, and Shaul Shay’s work on the 
Red Sea Region. Additionally, this thesis is supported by historical and contextual 
information regarding maritime and trade routes through the Suez Canal, Red Sea, Bab el 
Mandab, and the Gulf of Aden, primarily drawn from The Encyclopedia of World Trade,8 
that offers insight as to the evolution of global trade and causal factors that reinforce the 
importance of the Red Sea Region.  
a. U.S. Grand Strategy  
Yemen—as a geographically critical state in the CENTCOM AOR—has long been 
important to U.S. grand strategy, alternatively categorized by two primary schools of 
thought or four primary policy outlooks. Reich and Dombrowski define U.S. grand strategy 
as “the search for order and consistency in an ever-more complex world.”9 More broadly, 
grand strategy is understood as the processes and military assets a state employs to advance 
its values and policies based in the areas of foreign policy.10 Understanding different 
conceptualizations of U.S. grand strategic approaches, and how naval power fits in with 
those approaches, can help CENTCOM and U.S. leadership better identify alternative ways 
to formulate and operationally exercise naval strategy Red Sea region.  
The two primary schools of thought regarding U.S. grand strategy belong to John 
J. Mearsheimer and, together, to Francis Fukuyama and Charles Krauthammer. 
Mearsheimer believes that offshore balancing, which primarily focuses on ensuring U.S. 
dominance in Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf, “is the best way to ensure 
American primacy.”11 Counter to offshore balancing, Francis Fukuyama and Charles 
                                                 
8 Encyclopedia of World Trade, s.v. “bab el mandab,” accessed March 3, 2018, 
https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/detail.action?docID=2011181. 
9 Simon Reich and Peter J Dombrowski, The End of Grand Strategy: U.S. Maritime Operations in the 
Twenty-First Century, (London: Cornell University Press, 2017), 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=1589149. 
10 Reich and Dombrowski, The End of Grand Strategy, 1–12. 
11 John Mearsheimer, “Imperial by Design,” The National Interest, no. 111 (December 16, 2010): 16–
34, ProQuest. 
5 
Krauthammer advocate the U.S. grand strategy of global dominance, which they describe 
as a unipolar movement.12 
Andrew L. Ross and Barry R. Posen instead introduce U.S. grand strategy as not 
simply two schools of thought, but categorize it into four unique policy outlooks: neo-
isolationism, selective engagement, cooperative security, and primacy. Each of these four 
categories help describe U.S. grand strategy, and more narrowly CENTCOM strategy, in 
the AOR. 
The current U.S. grand strategy of global dominance, also known as global 
hegemony, focuses on maintaining U.S. primacy and spreading democracy around the 
globe, but not every scholar sees that as positive.13 While Krauthammer and Fukuyama 
have urged U.S. leaders to be bold in establishing the new global order and its enforcement 
in the wake of the Cold War,14  Mearsheimer describes the current U.S. strategy, followed 
since the Cold War, as “a strategy that is imperial to its core.”15 Mearsheimer argues against 
global dominance because he believes global dominance will only lead to endless war and 
global security obligations for the United States.16 Considered unsustainable by 
Mearsheimer, the U.S. strategy of global dominance has brought political backlash from 
the international community for  its imperialist nature.17 Mearsheimer emphasizes the need 
for the United States to reform its grand strategy and to, instead, follow offshore balancing. 
Offshore balancing is believed to promote stability and foster the responsibility of security 
in the hands of regional powers. Mearsheimer suggests that by shifting U.S. strategy to 
Offshore balancing, this would result in the end of what he describes as “the pursuit of 
global dominance.” Finally, since the international community would view the United 
States as less threatening should the U.S. turn its strategy toward offshore balancing, there 
might be less motivation for nuclear proliferation. As an alternative to global dominance, 
                                                 
12 Mearsheimer, “Imperial by Design,” 16–34. 
13 Mearsheimer, “Imperial by Design,” 16–34. 
14 Mearsheimer, “Imperial by Design,” 16–34. 
15 Mearsheimer, “Imperial by Design,” 16–34. 
16 Mearsheimer, “Imperial by Design,” 16–34. 
17 Mearsheimer, “Imperial by Design,” 16–34. 
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Mearsheimer proposes selective engagement, which assumes that, at any point in which 
there is a threat to Europe, Northeast Asia, or the Persian Gulf, the United States should 
pacify or at least manage the threat.  
The Yemen war, primarily the threat presented by the Houthis and AQAP, also 
qualifies as a threat to our allies. Since the Houthi and AQAP have threatened Saudi Arabia, 
the United States should be compelled to respond in accordance with selective engagement. 
The U.S. grand strategy does apply portions of selective engagement in regard to the 
CENTCOM AOR, but primarily U.S. strategy as it relates to Yemen is in accordance with 
global dominance. Even under the strategic implications of global dominance, however, 
the insurgent threat within Yemen qualifies the attention of U.S. maritime forces.  
According to Mearsheimer, the U.S. grand strategy of global dominance was 
reinforced in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11.18 The United States emphasized 
the need for increased presence within the Middle East and the responsibility of leading 
the Global War on Terror.19 Further, the strategy that allowed the Global War on Terror 
was based “off an over exaggerated threat of terrorism,” which “failed to understand why 
Al Qaeda had attacked the United States.”20 Following Reich and Dombrowski’s theory of 
tailored strategy, Mearsheimer’s statement offers evidence that the strategy of global 
dominance and overwhelming maritime force may not have been the appropriate response 
in the aftermath of 9/11.21 
Some argue that naval strategy and operations are a core and necessary component 
to U.S. grand strategy and have been central to U.S. strategic success since the late 
nineteenth century.22 In the Influence of Sea Power upon History, Admiral Thayer Mahan 
argued that the supremacy of the sea, known as “seapower,” would provide and sustain 
global power. Since the classic instrument of grand strategy has been the U.S. military, and 
                                                 
18 Mearsheimer, “Imperial by Design,” 16–34. 
19 Mearsheimer, “Imperial by Design,” 16–34. 
20 Mearsheimer, “Imperial by Design,” 16–34. 
21 Reich and Dombrowski, The End of Grand Strategy, 28–46. 
22 Reich and Dombrowski, The End of Grand Strategy, 66–84. 
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more closely the U.S. Navy, Mahan emphasized that “U.S. grand strategy should be one of 
primacy and entail patrolling the global commons,”23 influencing the requirement for the 
United States to maintain a naval presence in almost every ocean and sea across the world. 
Counter to Mahan’s strategy, Simon Reich and Peter Dombrowski consider today’s 
complex world too exceedingly challenging for a unipolar strategy.24 Reich and 
Dombrowski propose that strategy should be developed and tailored based on the specific 
dilemmas and threats of each conflict and that the magnitude of response will significantly 
depend on the available resources at any given time. In line with Reich and Dombrowski’s 
theory, U.S. Naval strategy should be tailored to deliver a calibrated response to the 
growing maritime insurgent threat within the Red Sea. If maritime insurgency is a growing 
threat to maritime operations within the Red Sea, then Mahan’s strategy may be too broad 
to efficiently remove the maritime threat. Reich and Dombrowski conclude that, by 
understanding the threat while evaluating the available recourses, a state can deliver a 
calibrated response to any strategic challenge.25  
For its part, the U.S. Navy has also articulated a vision for how naval strategy and 
operations fit in with and help advance broader U.S. strategic interests. The Cooperative 
Strategy for the 21st Century outlines the future of the U.S. maritime component strategy. 
The document’s core theme states that “the United States of America is a maritime 
nation.”26 There are two pillars of this maritime strategy: the requirement of maintaining a 
forward naval presence to accomplish the goals of national guidance and, second, the 
continued joint maritime operations with allies and partners to build a greater naval force.27 
According to the Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century, forward naval presence is 
essential for maintaining a secure global economic system and for ensuring the free flow 
                                                 
23 Reich and Dombrowski, The End of Grand Strategy, 66–84. 
24 Reich and Dombrowski  The End of Grand Strategy, 66–84. 
25 Reich and Dombrowski, The End of Grand Strategy, 66–84. 
26 United States Department of the Navy, A Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century (Washington, 
D.C.: United States Marine Corps, United States Department of the Navy, United States Coast Guard, 
2015), https://permanent.access.gpo.gov/gpo56257/150227-CS21R-Final.pdf. 
27 United States Department of the Navy, A Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century.  
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of trade. The strategy emphasizes that joint maritime operations will deter conflicts and 
provide a better response to aggression.28 
 The Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century also stresses the importance of the 
role of littoral combat in the U.S. Navy’s future. The U.S. Navy is currently implementing 
littoral combat ships, which offer an outstanding resource to counter the threats within the 
Red Sea, into its fleet. Littoral ships can help fight piracy and insurgent groups.  
b. Norman Cigar’s Work on Non-state Actors 
Norman Cigar argues, in “The Jihadist Maritime Strategy: Waging a Guerrilla War 
at Sea,” that states have largely failed to establish effective strategies to counter non-state 
groups, especially jihadists.29 Cigar’s article deepens the understanding of how jihadist 
strategies have evolved, provides insight to U.S. planners and operators, and explains how 
maritime strategy fits into jihadist objectives.30 Although Cigar’s monograph focuses on 
the jihadist threat in particular, it has relevance for other non-state actors. In the case of 
Yemen, the Houthis have shown a willingness and ability to expand operations into the 
maritime environment. Indeed, it seems that not much has been done as Houthi fighters 
have begun arming vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED) against maritime 
traffic, Cigar’s argument for improved maritime strategy proves a valid point.31 
c. Shaul Shay’s Work on the Red Sea Region 
In his book, The Red Sea Terror Triangle, Shaul Shay argues that, in the wake of 
the terror campaign launch after 9/11, the United States began to fight wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan but dismissed potentially dangerous targets within the Red Sea region.32 
Shay’s assessment is based on historical data of Islamic terror organizations within Sudan, 
                                                 
28 United States Department of the Navy, A Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century.  
29 Norman Cigar, The Jihadist Maritime Strategy: Waging a Guerrilla War at Sea (Quantico, Virginia: 
Marine Corps University, 2017), 2–4. 
30 Cigar, The Jihadist Maritime Strategy, 2–4. 
31 Cigar, The Jihadist Maritime Strategy, 2–4. 
32 Shaul Shay, The Red Sea Terror Triangle: Sudan Somalia, Yemen, and Islamic terror (New 
Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction, 2007) 1–223. 
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Somalia, and Yemen. Shay also explores how terrorist organizations within the triangle 
maintain close ties, providing a base for future growth.33 Shay provides a very specific 
comparative study of the three states, which do not have an abundance of published 
comparative studies available. Shay’s research also provides past examples of insurgent 
threats on maritime operations. Shay’s assessments may shed light on the potential growth 
of terrorist organizations within Yemen if they are left unchecked by U.S. and coalition 
strategy. Further research into the Houthi organization within Yemen may reveal a 
disconnection between Sudan and Somalia. Ultimately, it is necessary to complete this 
comparative study to eliminate any question of possible terrorist organization connections 
and growth within the Red Sea region. 
d. Conclusion 
The preceding review provided an overview of the primary schools of the thought 
regarding the role of seapower in U.S. grand strategy. The elements of these strategic 
theories are evident in U.S. grand strategy as well as in the U.S. Navy’s future strategic 
forecast. These theories help illuminate the place and purpose of seapower in U.S. grand 
strategy and provide a way of looking at the potential applications of maritime operations 
in conflict zones such as Yemen.  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis inquiries into how, since 2011, the civil war in Yemen has affected U.S. 
interests, strategy, and operations in the Arabian Peninsula and how the rise of Houthi 
power, potentially backed by Iranian military assistance, has impacted the maritime context 
and U.S. naval operations along Yemen’s coasts. U.S. and coalition counter insurgency 
strategy within CENTCOM, and primarily in Yemen, is an independent variable as regards 
the continuing growth of the Houthis.  
  
                                                 
33 Shay and Liberman, The Red Sea Terror Triangle, 1–223. 
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1. Hypothesis One  
As the Houthis have expanded their combat capabilities and political control over 
Yemen, the threat to U.S. and coalition maritime operations has increased, meriting a new 
strategy. 
2. Hypothesis Two  
The Houthis do not pose a new threat to maritime operations in the Red Sea region. 
There is thus no need for a U.S. strategy to eliminate the insurgent threat in Yemen. 
3. Hypothesis Three  
The U.S. Navy and coalition partners have sufficiently managed the growing 
Houthi and AQAP threat. It is not necessary to revise the current operational approach 
strategy or deploy more resources to the region.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis inquires as to whether the insurgency within Yemen is a threat to U.S. 
and coalition maritime operations within the Red Sea Region. In addition to drawing on 
the theories of U.S. grand strategy, to understand the domestic threat within Yemen—the 
Houthis—this thesis utilizes a National Defense Research Institute report titled, Regime 
and Periphery in Northern Yemen by Barak A. Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine 
Wells to explain how Yemen’s domestic causal factors have enabled insurgency. Regime 
and Periphery in Northern Yemen provides extensive qualitative data and historic coverage 
on the Yemen government, the Zaydi branch of Islam, the Al Houthi family, “Shi’ite 
Terror,” and domestic oil production as it pertains to Yemen’s economy.34 Regime and 
Periphery in Northern Yemen also provides empirical demographic data, conflict statistics, 
and maps of economic and military networks within Yemen.  
To understand how the external reactions and foreign influence have either 
prevented growth or encouraged expansion of Yemen’s insurgency, this thesis researches 
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U.S. grand strategy and, more narrowly, CENTCOM strategy, and its effect on preventing 
the threat of Yemen’s insurgency to identify whether either foreign influences or U.S. 
strategy is the primary causal factor for insurgent growth in Yemen.  
To examine how insurgency has threatened maritime operations within the Red Sea 
region, this thesis researches documented maritime insurgent activity since 2011 through 
recognized media articles, which give real account of maritime threats in the Red Sea. This 
thesis researches the capabilities of this threat, the impact on maritime operations after each 
attack, and whether attacks have increased since 2011, therefore identifying whether the 
threat has increased and whether U.S. and coalition leaders need a revised strategy.  
F. CHAPTER DESIGN 
Following this introduction, Chapter II examines the Houthi insurgency in Yemen, 
and Chapter III examines their maritime insurgency and attacks. Chapter IV then examines 
the U.S. response, and, subsequently, Chapter V summarizes findings, provides 
recommendations, and suggests a direction for future research.  
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II. INSURGENCY IN YEMEN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Arab Spring of 2011 is synonymous with the rise of insurgency in the Middle 
East. At the time, Yemen was struggling with widespread poverty and decades of 
government corruption.35 The years that followed saw the rise of Ansar Allah, better known 
as the Houthis, and the collapse of Yemen’s formal government. As the Houthis gained 
power in parts of Yemen, neighboring Arab states led a military intervention to eliminate 
the Houthi threat. As the Yemen war escalated, the Houthis, with the support of Iran, 
expanded their military campaign into the maritime domain.36 
While Chapter I introduced the question of whether the Iran-backed Houthi 
insurgency has increased the maritime threat to the U.S., Chapter II explores how the 
Houthis have increased instability in the Red Sea region. First, the chapter describes 
Yemen’s security environment following the Arab Spring of 2011 and the current security 
challenge the Houthis pose and then gives a background of Iran’s support to the Houthis 
as well as its ties to Hezbollah.  
B. YEMEN’S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT POST-ARAB SPRING 
a. Ansar Allah and a Collapsed State 
As Yemen’s civilian population’s resentment toward President Ali Abdullah Saleh 
grew, the Saleh regime seemingly knew that change was required. Confronted by bloody 
nationwide protests in 2012, President Ali Abdullah Saleh stepped down, and Vice 
President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi stepped up.37 Many Yemenis saw the change in office 
as new hope for the future.38 Even under President Hadi, however, Yemen’s government 
                                                 
35 Marcel Serr, “Understanding the War in Yemen.” Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs 11, no. 3 
(January 2018): 357–369, Taylor and Francis  
36 Serr, “Understanding the War in Yemen,” 357–369. 
37 “Yemen: Who Was Ali Abdullah Saleh?” Al Jazeera, December 4, 2017, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/yemen/2011/02/201122812118938648.html. 
38 Serr, “Understanding the War in Yemen,” 357–369. 
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and infrastructure continued to weaken.39 By 2014, as tensions grew from Saleh loyalists 
within the government, and public support for Hadi declined as a result of increased 
unemployment and food scarcity, the Houthis allied with former President Saleh, steering 
the state of Yemen toward complete collapse.40 
The alliance of former President Saleh, who still held the loyalty of Yemeni military 
forces, with the Houthis greatly increased both parties’ military capabilities. The Houthis 
moved aggressively across key provinces in Yemen, capturing the capital city of Sana’a in 
September 2014 and taking the second largest port and strategic Red Sea city of Hodeida 
in October.41 In 2015, the Houthis continued capturing territory near Aden including its 
international airport and the Al Anad Air Base in Lahij.42 The security environment in 
Yemen worsened after the Houthis bombed President Hadi’s temporary headquarters, as 
well as coalition headquarters, in October 2015.43 
As the Houthis grew in power, the United Nations (UN) Security Council began to 
investigate the source of the Houthis weapons and material aid. In 2015, the UN announced 
they had discovered the Houthis had been receiving aid from Iran.44 In response to the 
growing threat and the fear that the group would eventually become an extension of Iran 
in the Arabian Peninsula, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) announced the coalition 
campaign “Operation Decisive Storm” on March 26, 2015.45  
Although Operation Decisive Storm stymied the Houthis’ momentum, it also had a 
severe toll on civilian populations. Led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE), Operation Decisive Storm focused heavily on comprehensive air strikes to 
eliminate the Houthi ground forces and naval blockades to prevent the supply of new 
                                                 
39 Serr, “Understanding the War in Yemen,” 357–369. 
40 Emile Hokayem and David B. Roberts, “The War in Yemen,” Survival 58, no. 6 (November 2016): 
162, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2016.1257202. 
41 Hokayem and Roberts, “The War in Yemen,”163. 
42 Hokayem and Roberts, “The War in Yemen,” 165. 
43 Hokayem and Roberts, “The War in Yemen,” 169. 
44 Hokayem and Roberts, “The War in Yemen,” 163. 
45 Hokayem and Roberts, “The War in Yemen,” 163. 
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weapons from reaching the Houthis from outside Yemen.46 The air campaign had mixed 
success. UN Security Council 2216 evaluated the coalition air strikes led by Saudi Arabia 
and found that they had been careless and inaccurate, resulting in unnecessary collateral 
damage and the death of thousands of civilians.47  
Coalition naval blockades also had a negative humanitarian impact. Although the 
blockades intended to prevent outside weapons (especially those originating from Iran) 
from being smuggled into Yemen, they also prevented vital food and medicine from 
reaching Yemen’s civilian population.48 Since Yemen imports over 75% of its consumable 
goods,49 coalition naval blockades consequently created a humanitarian crisis as Yemen’s 
population suffered from an enormous shortage of consumable goods.50 
Operation Decisive Storm had negative repercussions overall including on 
maritime operations. Although the operation meant to stop the Houthi insurgency, the 
immense number of civilian casualties by Saudi and coalition airstrikes angered the 
Houthis and led to them threatening the maritime environment. In response to Operation 
Decisive Storm and Saudi Arabia’s air strikes in Yemen, Saleh al-Samad, the acting head 
of the Houthi administration, publicly informed the UN on January 8, 2018 that the Houthis 
would “turn to tragic options…including cutting off Red Sea and international 
navigation.”51 Although the Houthis had already performed maritime attacks before 
Samad’s announcement,52 Samad’s threat was realized when the Houthis began to increase 
                                                 
46 Hokayem and Roberts, “The War in Yemen,” 166. 
47 Hokayem and Roberts, “The War in Yemen,” 167. 
48 Hokayem and Roberts, “The War in Yemen,” 167. 
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maritime attacks in the Red Sea and in the Gulf of Aden.53 Those attacks included using 
vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices and anti-ship missiles.54  
b. End of the Saleh-Houthi Alliance and Houthi Empowerment 
The Houthis continued to grow in strength, and the Yemen war entered a new phase 
with the break of the Saleh-Houthi alliance in 2017. Saleh, who had aligned with the 
Houthis to topple UN backed-president of Yemen, Adb-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, approached 
Saudi Arabia after the Houthis had accomplished Saleh’s strategic objectives.55 In 
December of 2017, Saleh officially broke ties with the Houthis and realigned with Saudi 
Arabia.56 In response to Saleh’s betrayal, Houthi-led riots overtook the streets of Sana’a. 
The riots finally ended on December 4, 2017, when the Houthis executed Saleh.57 The riots 
and execution of Saleh worsened Yemen’s already fragile socio- and economic instability, 
allowing the Houthis take control of the state government with little contest. 
The economic collapse of Yemen rendered the state vulnerable.58 After the 
economic collapse, territories in norther Yemen fell under the control of the Houthis’ tribal 
based militia.59 In order to maintain the revenue to fund the organization, the Houthis 
replaced the government tax collectors.60 The Houthis also extorted businesses and seized 
civilian assets to fund their movement, which was estimated to be in excess of 1.62 billion 
U.S. dollars in annual revenue.61 As of May 2018, the Houthis maintained control of over 
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61 Himmiche et al., Panel of Experts on Yemen Report S/2018/68, 37. 
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half of Yemen.62 They occupy the capital city of Sana’a, which is also the location of their 
government headquarters. To the north, the Houthis have taken control of the provinces of 
Amran and Hijah.63 They have also occupied the Red Sea port of Hodeida, a strategic 
location that allows the Houthis to regulate and apply duties to all goods that travel into 
Yemen from Hodeida.64 Along the unofficial border of North and South Yemen, the 
Houthis took control of Bayda,65 a town located on a plateau in south-central Yemen and 
once a regional capital.66 This valuable and strategic location provides the Houthis 
unencumbered smuggling routes from the Persian Gulf, southern Yemen, and through to 
Sana’a.67 Finally, to the south, the Houthis control Taiz, which provides them access to the 
Gulf of Aden (see Figure 1).68 
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Figure 1. Map of Yemen.69 
c. A New State 
The formality and structure of the Houthi organizations empower their maritime 
offensive capabilities. After the fall of Saleh, and the officially recognized state of Yemen, 
the Houthis created a very structured form of government and formally occupied provinces, 
imposed taxes, and enforced laws.70 The Houthis’ government is led by the Supreme 
Political Council, currently Mahdi al Mashat, and UN recognized authority for the 
Houthis.71 Receiving direction from the Supreme Political Council, each province has an 
appointed governor, listed as follows.72 
 Faysal Ja’ Man, governor of Amran 
 Fadhil al-Sharqi. governor of Dhamar 
 Nayef Abu Kharfashah, governor of Hijjah 
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 Abd al-Khaliq Badr al-Din al-Houthi, governor of Hodeida 
 Ahmed Qatinah, governor of Sana’a 
 Faysal Ja’ Man, governor of Amran 
 Manour al-Lakoumi, Governor Ta’izz73  
The Houthis have also organized a systematized military chain of command and 
combined their state security with the military to form one overarching organization.74 
Although the Houthi military ground and work force had been composed primarily of tribal 
militia, the leadership drew from the Yemeni military Officers who had aligned with the 
Houthis.75 Table 1 lists the Houthi military chain of command, including primary role and 
rank.  
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Figure 2. Houthi Military Chain of Command January 2018.76 
C. TIES TO IRAN 
Iran’s interest in Yemen may be narrow because its desire to be recognized as a 
legitimate global power outweighs the limited potential of the Houthis. Iran’s support for 
the Houthis could be as an opportunity to influence non-state actors who are opposing 
regional powers. Most importantly, Iran’s fundamental strategy for Houthis is a low-cost 
opportunity for Iran to create a strong distraction for the United States, United Arab 
Emirates, and Saudi Arabia.77 
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Saudi Arabia claims that Iran’s support of the Houthis within Yemen has made the 
conflict in Yemen a proxy war.78 From Saudi Arabia’s perspective, by infiltrating Yemen, 
Iran has sought to destabilize the borders of Saudi Arabia.79 Iran, however, rejects claims 
that it has supported the Houthis militarily.80 Saudi Arabia has continued to substantiate 
their claim of Iran’s support of the Houthis by citing evidence that sea vessels from Iran 
have been transporting weapons to the Houthis since April of 2009.81  
The history of the al-Houthi family’s connection to Iran began in 1978 and has 
helped shape the Iranian outlook on politics. Abdul Malik al Houthi studied Shi’a Islam in 
Iran from 1978–1979 and has been noted to have an affinity for Iran, which may have been 
influenced in that period.82 Until 2004, there was not very much evidence of Iranian 
involvement within Yemen. After 2004, Iran began a limited support of military, financial, 
and political aid to the Houthis. This continued into the Arab Spring, but significantly 
increased in 2014.83  
The 2015 UN Security Council Report (S/2018/68) has discovered evidence that 
Iran has possibly provided significant support to the Houthis.84 Beginning in 2009, Iran 
began increasing the shipping of weapons to the Houthis.85 According to UN Security 
Council 2216, as the Arab Spring continued in Yemen, Iranian fishing vessels were found 
to be carrying over 900 Iranian anti-tank missiles destined for Yemen. In 2013, the UN 
reported the interception of several sea vessels, confirming an Iranian shipment of a man-
portable air defense system, 122mm rockets, RPG launchers, C-4 plastic, and equipment 
to build improvise explosive devices.86  
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The UN has also linked Iran’s assistance to the Houthis in the form of unmanned 
aerial vehicles.87 On November 27, 2016, Saudi Arabian border officials intercepted a truck 
carrying six complete Qasef-1 unmanned aerial vehicles and the components to supply 
twenty-four more drones.88 The investigating UN panel discovered that the Qasef-1 drones 
were “virtually identical to the Ababil-T,” manufactured in Iran.89 The vehicles’ navigation 
components had also been manufactured in Iran, leading UN investigators to conclude that 
Iran had disguised the components to avoid exposing their origin and final destination.90  
The motivation to conceal the origin of these vehicles correlates with Iran’s 
commitment to not openly violate the Targeted Arms Embargo of 2015.91 UN Resolution 
2216 was issued on April 14th, 2015 in an effort to “reestablish peace, stability, and 
security of Yemen.”92 The resolution banned the supply of weapons and military aid to 
former President Saleh’s forces as well as to the Houthis and their counterparts.93 Saudi 
Arabia has since claimed that Iran is in direct violation of Section 14 of Resolution 2216, 
which states that “all Member States shall immediately take the necessary measures to 
prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to, or for the benefit of Ali Abdullah 
Saleh, Abdullah Yahya Al Hakim, Abd Al-Khaliq Al-Houthi, and the individuals and 
entities.”94 
The UN investigation also concluded that Iran has supported the Houthi maritime 
capability in the Red Sea.95 This support has been correlated with the Houthis’ mining of 
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the areas along the Red Sea coastline.96 In 2017, the United Arab Emirate discovered three 
sea mines in small port of Mukha in the southern Red Sea.97 Two similar mines were 
discovered in the southern red sea near Thwaq Island, one of which was actually recovered 
on March 23, 2017 (see Figure 3).98 Utilizing data from the Iranian Arms Fair in 2015 (see 
Figure 4), the UN panel concluded that the mines used by the Houthis in the Red Sea: were 
“consistent in size and shape of bottom sea mines manufactured in Iran.”99 
 
Figure 3. Similar Sea Mines Discovered near Thwaq Island.100  
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Figure 4. Image of Sea Mine from Iranian Arms Fair.101  
The UN panel concluded that “Iran failed to take the necessary measures to prevent 
the direct or indirect supply, sale of transfer of Norkan-2h short-range ballistic missiles, 
field storage tanks for liquid bipropellant oxidizer for missiles, and Ababil-T (Qasef-1) 
unmanned aerial vehicles to Houthi-Saleh alliance.”102 Iran released a response to the UN 
panel, as required by UN Security Council Resolution 2342(2017), which methodically 
listed Iran’s disputes against the panel’s findings.103 Iran firmly argued that the findings of 
the U.N. panel were “biased” and “based on fabricated evidence by Saudi Arabia.”104 Iran 
concluded by summarizing its stand against the panel’s findings, stating that: “the Islamic 
Republic of Iran categorically rejects those baseless allegations contained in the Panel’s 
report, and reiterates that it has no policy to transfer to, or manufacture arms in[,] 
Yemen.”105 
 Beyond the supply of weapons and aid, U.S. intelligence has reported that Iran is 
providing training and political support of Houthi troops. During a public CENTCOM 
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statement, General Joseph Votel stated, “Iran has extended its tentacles across the region 
through numerous proxies…prolonging the civil war in Yemen, threatening Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE, and risking expansion of Yemen’s civil war into a regional conflict.”106 The 
Iranians have provided the Houthis with training on weapons handling, aerial drones, 
insurgency, and improvised explosives.107  
The Iran-Houthi relationship may not be formed primarily on their connection of 
Shi’a Islam. In 2014, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani described the Houthi takeover of 
Sana’a as “a brilliant and a resounding victory.”108 This statement, although not directly 
advocating the actions of the Houthis, shows Iran’s hope for continued Houthi victories. 
According to Thomas Juneau, the Iranians seek out non-state actors, like the Houthis, who 
are dissatisfied with state institutions and fighting within a fragmented state.109 
D. TIES TO HEZBOLLAH 
Lebanese Hezbollah has been assisting the Houthis since before they began their 
insurgency. According to Jack Freeman, Hezbollah has provided a “model” of 
insurgency.110 Prominent Lebanese Shi’a leader Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah presented 
this model to the Houthis through the provisions of videotaped learning aids, books, and 
even lectures.111 Hezbollah continues to provide political support for the Houthis. In 2016, 
an unnamed Hezbollah commander stated, “After we are done with Syria, we will start 
with Yemen, Hezbollah is already there…Who do you think fires Tochka missiles into 
Saudi Arabia? It’s not the Houthis in their sandals, it is us!”112  
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E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter explored Yemen’s security environment following the Arab Spring 
and documented support to the Houthis by Iran as well as the Houthis’ ties to Hezbollah. 
Following the Arab Spring of 2011, the Houthis have created an unstable security 
environment, a consequence of the adverse result of the Houthi-Saleh alliance and the 
Iran’s support to the Houthis, which has resulted in the Houthis taking control over strategic 
territory across Yemen. The following chapter discusses the unstable maritime security 
environment of the Red Sea region, the Houthis’ increased frequency of maritime 
terrorism, and the various weapons capability utilized by the Houthis. 
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III. MARITIME INSURGENCY 
While Chapter II examined the roots of the Houthi insurgency and Iran’s support 
of it, Chapter III examines the impact on the maritime domain. First, the chapter examines 
the Houthis’ maritime objective then their strategy for maritime insurgency, their missile 
capacity, and the impacts on the maritime domain.  
A. THE HOUTHIS’ MARITIME INSURGENCY OBJECTIVE 
The Houthis, who have taken primary control of Yemen and desire to be recognized 
as the legitimate governing body of Yemen, have set their sights on disrupting maritime 
shipping and the safety of navigation in the Red Sea Region. Their primary targets are 
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and U.S. and coalition partners. The political objective for the 
Houthis would be to force the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), primarily Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE, as well as the United States, into negotiations to end the war in Yemen.113 
Ultimately, the Houthis’ strategy for maritime insurgency centers on utilizing the coasts of 
Yemen to launch manned fast boats, armed drone boats, and medium to long-range 
missiles.  
Piracy has occurred at sea for centuries, but maritime insurgency is a fairly new 
occurrence.114 Unlike piracy, where seafaring combatants seek to capture maritime vessels 
and their contents for monetary reward,115 maritime insurgency attempts to disrupt 
navigational safety in a coercive effort for political gain. Utilizing Yemen’s Red Sea 
coastline and establishing offensive missile vantage points from mountains that overlook 
Bab el Mandab, a critical maritime strait, allows the Houthis to prey upon the Red Sea’s 
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U.S. and coalition maritime traffic.116 The Houthis have focused primarily on vessels 
originating or carrying cargo from Saudi Arabia and the UAE as well as U.S. military ships 
while the passage of ships that are not directly engaged with the war in Yemen have 
remained unharmed.  
The United States has been targeted due to its involvement supporting Saudi Arabia 
and the United Arab Emirates with drone strikes, intelligence, mid-air refueling, all of 
which were approved in March of 2015 by U.S. President Barack Obama.117 Maritime 
attacks dramatically increased after coalition airstrikes against Houthi forces in Yemen 
killed more than 140 civilians and injured 525 during a funeral in Sana’a.118  
Since the Houthis have control of the strategic Red Sea city Hodeida, and offensive 
positions to fire anti-ship missiles transiting the Gulf of Aden and Bab el Mandab, there is 
an extensive account of their maritime attacks since 2016.119 Houthi attacks have had 
negative impacts on Saudi and UAE oil shipping through the Red Sea. These impacts, 
longer travel and higher cost shipping, affect the stability of oil markets in Europe and 
North America. Figure 5 presents a chronological summary of Houthi maritime insurgency 
in the Red Sea region. 
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Figure 5. UN Threat Map Red Sea Region.120 
B. STRATEGY FOR INSURGENCY  
In 2016, there was a rise in Red Sea maritime security incidents directed by the 
Houthis toward U.S. and GCC maritime vessels. These attacks impaired the strategic sea 
lines of communication within the Red Sea and limited the ability primarily for U.S. and 
GCC maritime vessels to exit the Suez Canal.121 According to Houthi spokesman 
Mohammad al-Bukhaiti, the Houthis “consider Emiratis and Saudis their enemies, and so 
anything that belongs to them is a legitimate target for Houthi forces.”122 The primary 
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motivation for the Houthis to disrupt the Saudi and Emirate oil market, and degrade their 
state-owned assets, is to coerce U.S. and coalition partners into quickly ending the war in 
Yemen, which would grant the Houthis complete and officially recognized control over 
Yemen.123 The following sections discuss how the Houthis have primarily utilized drone 
boats, manned vessels, and medium- to long-range missiles to achieve their objective. 
a. Manned Vessels and Drone Boats 
The use of drone boats has significantly enhanced Houthi offensive capabilities 
within the Red Sea. These unmanned vehicle-born improvised explosive devices 
(UMVBIED) provide an unmanned, medium range, offensive capability to damage and 
even incapacitate maritime vessels.124 This drone boat tactic physically translates into a 
shore-based operator who guides a remote-controlled skiff that contains explosives to its 
desired maritime contact (see Figure 6).125  
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Figure 6. The Unmanned Boat Bomb Detailed during a 12 December 2017 
U.S. Presentation on Iranian Assistance to Ansar Allah. 
 
b. Port of Jizan 
The Houthis launched a UMVBIED in the Port of Jizan, providing an excellent 
example of how the Houthis can easily launch, and remotely guide, a UMVBIED as long 
as they have a favorable location. The Port of Jizan is Saudi Arabia’s most southwest sea 
Red Sea port.126 Regarded as the Red Sea’s most important port due to its close proximity 
to Bab el Mandab, the Port of Jizan is a primary port for Red Sea shipping and maintains 
a large flow of maritime traffic.127 With over 200 miles of coastline, in addition to being 
connected to over 100 small islands, the Port of Jizan offered the Houthis an excellent 
launch point for drone boats.128  
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On April 24, 2017, the Houthis attempted an attack on the Port of Jizan.129 Utilizing 
a UMVBIED, the Houthis remote guided the explosives until intercepted by the Saudi 
Arabian Coastguard.130 Although the UMVBIED was intercepted, it was intercepted only 
1.5 nautical miles from its target, coming dangerously close.131 The Port of Jizan is an oil 
terminal, owned and operated by Saudi Arabia. The primary motivation for the Houthis 
against Jizan is in an effort to disrupt Saudi oil market and degrade state owned assets.132 
c. MT Muskie 
Following the attack in the Port of Jizan, the Houthis apparently displayed their 
tactical versatility. The Houthis have been accused133 of attacking, on May 31, 2017, the 
Marshall Island flagged Oil Tanker MT Muskie as it transited through the Bab el Mandab 
straits.134 If it was them, they used a small manned fast boat, which was carrying a manually 
operated rocket-propelled grenade 7 (RPG-7).135 Although the attacks may have been from 
Somali pirates, the Houthis have not been ruled out as the primary suspects.136 
 The vessel was in transit to Jeddah in Saudi Arabia when attackers fired the RPG-
7 near Perim Island, which is only a few kilometers off the coast of Yemen. In this event, 
the utilization of Perim Island, which is strategically located in the center of the southern 
entrance of the mouth of Bab el Mandab, allowed the attackers a short-range launch point 
for attack. The vessels gross tonnage was over 42271 tons at the time of the attacks, 
representing a significantly large amount of oil destined for Saudi Arabia.137 
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The drastic attempt to attack the MT Muskie proved unsuccessful. The manned 
small boat, which was supposedly deployed by Houthi forces, fired on the MT Muskie with 
AK-47s and managed to launch three RPG-7s.138 Fortunately for the MT Muskie, a four-
man security detachment was employed onboard and returned fire at the Houthi small 
boat.139 The only damage to the large vessel was to insulation and paneling after one of the 
RPG-7s overshot the wheel house.140  
Although this event did not result in damage and proved that maritime attacks can 
be thwarted, it is only one of many attacks. In the case of the MT Muskie, a security team 
embarked and prepared to defend the vessel.141 It is not common for vessels to employ full 
time security teams at sea. If the team had not been embarked, the Houthis may have 
succeeded in their attack.  
d. Saudi Oil Tanker January 6, 2018 
Recently, U.S. and coalition forces have resorted to providing military escort to 
presumed Houthi maritime targets. On January 6, 2018, the Houthis utilized UMVBIED 
assets to attack a Saudi Arabian oil tanker near the port of Al-Hodeida.142 GCC spokesman 
Colonel Turki al-Maliki gave an official press briefing in which he described the two 
separate UMVBIED attacks that had taken place.143 The first attack reached its target, but 
coalition forces blocked the second.144 This specific attempt was directly after Saleh al-
Salmad, the head of the rebel Houthi government, threatened to “turn to strategic 
options…including cutting off the Red Sea and international shipping.”145  
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In response to the attack, Saudi Arabia’s coalition spokesman, Colonel Turki al-
Maliki, warned of inevitable future attacks by the Houthis.146 Colonel Maliki stated that 
“there is no doubt that the port of Hodeida has become a starting point or terrorist 
operations threatening the maritime navigation in the Red Sea and Bab el Mandab.”147 
Maliki also requested that the UN take initiative and control of the port from the Houthis.148 
Colonel Maliki’s statement and requests further reinforce the outcry from U.S. regional 
partners to help secure the Red Sea from the Houthis.  
e. Saudi Oil Tanker April 3, 2018 
Following the attack on January 6, 2018, the Houthis attacked another Saudi 
Arabian oil tanker on April 3, 2018, near the port city of Hodeida.149 The Houthis publicly 
stated that the attack was in retaliation against Saudi Arabia’s airstrike on Hodeida, which 
resulted in twelve civilian causalities.150 In a public statement by Saudi Arabia, “a coalition 
warship conducted swift intervention, foiling the attack…but the attack still resulted in a 
slight and ineffective hit to the oil tanker.”151 Marking yet another attack in the Red Sea 
region, U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres “urged the warring sides in Yemen to 
reach a political settlement to end a conflict now in its fourth year that has left 22 million 
people in urgent need of aid.”152 
These events could have been far worse if coalition vessels had not been present to 
provide defensive measures. Despite the coalition’s efforts, these cases show how the 
Houthis evolved their usage UMVBIED and their willingness to retaliate against coalition 
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forces. Their tactic of deploying two separate drone boats was partially successful. Along 
with Saleh al Salmad’s threatening announcement, these attacks show that the Houthis are 
likely to reinforce their public statements with action. Although Red Sea shipping was not 
“cut off,” the immediate action taken by the Houthis in the Red Sea indicates their 
motivation to restrict Red Sea shipping by threatening the safety of navigation. 
C. MISSILE THREATS 
The Houthis have demonstrated both short and long-range missile capability and a 
willingness to utilize their inventory against what they call “Saudi Arabian aggression in 
Yemen.”153 Although these missiles may not always directly attack maritime vessels, they 
could be utilized against maritime ports and resources decreasing the overall stability and 
security of the Red Sea region’s maritime domain. 
The Houthis have focused their missiles on both maritime vessels and fixed land-
based targets. Their missiles provide the Houthis with offensive mobility, versatility, and 
range. Saudi Arabia’s air defense is critical because it aids U.S. and coalition forces with a 
broader tactical picture of the region as well as early warning against threats.154 Fixed land-
based air defense is excellent when defending land-based targets, but the Houthis are not 
only utilizing their missiles against land-based Saudi Arabian assets, but also against U.S. 
and coalition maritime traffic in the Red Sea region. This offensive maritime capability the 
Houthis have displayed has resulted in several catastrophes for Saudi Arabia. 
a. Missile Inventory
The Houthis have apparently amassed an impressive weapons stockpile. Saudi 
Arabia has confirmed over thirty-four missile launches against their state by the Houthis 
between 2015 through 2017.155 The Houthis inventory is stockpiled with repurposed S-75 
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surface to air missiles (SAM) in order to create the Qaher-1.156 Along with the Qaher-1, 
the Houthis also obtained the Burkan-1 (see Figure 7), unveiled the Burkan-2 on February 
6, 2017,157 Zelzal 2 (see Figure 8 and Figure 9), Zelzal 3, and various Scud missiles 
believed to originate from North Korea and Russia.158 
Figure 7. Rebels Unveiled Their Burkan-1 Ballistic Missile on 
2 September 2016.159 
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Figure 8. 610MM Zelzal 2.160  
 
Figure 9. Zelzal 2.161  
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The Houthi ballistic missile inventory has the capability to threaten the entire Red 
Sea region (see Figure 10). The Qaher-1 is claimed to have a range of 155 miles.162 Also 
since the Qaher-1 poses a fragmentation warhead, it us tactically employed to detonate 
above its target, providing a larger impact diameter.163 With a range of 391 miles and over 
double the range of the Qaher-1, the Burkan-1 can reach the outskirts of Al-Taif Air Base 
when launched from the Yemen-Saudi border.164 Although the Burkan-1 provided the 
Houthis within an increased targeting range, Saudi Arabia’s Patriot Missile Defense system 
has consistently intercepted the missile before reaching its target.165  
 
Figure 10. Yemeni Missile Threat Zone.166 
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On February 6, 2017, the Houthis publicly announced the possession of the Burkan-
2 and stated it was the solution to the Saudi Patriot Missile Defense capability.167 The 
complete specifications of the Burkan-2 are not publicly available, but pictures of the 
missile have been obtained and analyzed.168 After analysis, IHS Intelligence Review has 
claimed the Burkan-2 possess a “shuttlecock” warhead, which was assessed due to the 
warhead’s smaller diameter in comparison to Burkan-1.169 The Burkan-2 “shuttlecock” 
warhead is named after the missile’s separate sprint vehicle, which detaches after its 
atmospheric re-entry.170 Finally, the Burkan-2 is claimed to be highly versatile since it can 
be mobilized and launched from the rear of a tractor-trailer.171 
The Houthis also possess the Zelzal 2 and 3. The Zelzal 2 and 3 are described as an 
“unguided scud missile.”172 The primary difference between the two medium range 
ballistic rockets is that the Zelzal 3 has a slightly farther maximum range.173 The technical 
summary of the Zelzal describes that it was built by Iran, carries a 600 kg warhead, is 
extremely limited in accuracy, and has an estimated range of 250 km.174 The Zelzal has 
reportedly been used in strikes against Saudi Arabia as recently as August of 2016.175 
The Houthi ballistic missile capability has been very threatening to U.S. regional 
allies. These missiles provide the Houthis with a missile capability comparable to regional 
state powers like Iran. Although these ballistic missiles could not be used against surface 
vessels directly, the ability to reach long-range land targets places ports and air-defense 
capability in peril. 
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The best anti-surface offensive weapon in the Houthi missile inventory is the C-
802. The C-802 is a subsonic missile, originally built by China and later exported to Iran.176 
It is designated as an anti-ship cruise missile with a range of approximately 75 miles.177 
Utilizing an inertial guidance and active radar system, the C-802 is considered to be highly 
accurate.178 The C-802 can be fired from ground, air, and sea, making it extremely versatile 
(see Figure 11).179 Its capability and launching versatility has been very evident in the 
numerous instances the Houthis have fired the C-802 against surface vessels in the Red 
Sea region. 
 
Figure 11. IMDA C-802180 
The capabilities listed above places ships transiting in the Red Sea’s coastal waters, 
and especially the Bab el Mandab, in range of shore-based attack. Thanks to the mobility 
of the C-802, and the approximate 75-mile range, the Houthis are capable of reaching 
approximately 40 percent of the widest 190-mile point of the Red Sea.181 Also, since Bab 
el Mandab is 18 miles wide, and divided by Perim Island, the Houthis can certainly target 
a vessel traveling through the strait.182 
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b. Houthi Missile Attacks
On December 20, 2015, the Houthi Brigadier General Sharaf Luqman reported that 
the Houthis have selected over 300 ballistic missile targets within Saudi Arabia.183 The 
targets were not announced at the time, but, since 2015, the Houthis have shown diversity 
in the target profile.184 With an inventory of approximately seventy missiles, the Houthis 
may not be capable of reaching 300 targets but still present a threat to the Saudis. 
In one of their most catastrophic maritime attacks, the Houthis attack the United 
Arab Emirates HSV-2 Swift as it transited the Bab el Mandab straights on October 1, 
2016.185 The Houthi-Saleh forces were believed to have launched Chinese built C-802 
missiles from shore.186 The coastal attack by the Houthis devastated the HSV-2 Swift, 
leaving 22 of 24 crew members dead, obliterating the bridge, and completely incapacitating 
the vessel (see Figure 12).187 The United Arab Emirates and the UN both condemned the 
attack, mentioning the ship was carrying humanitarian aid.188 On October 6, 2016, the UN 
Security Council publicly stated that “Members take threats to shipping around Bab el 
Mandab, a strategically important shipping passage, extremely seriously.”189  
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Figure 12. Image of HSV-2 Swift after it Was Attacked by Houthi-Saleh 
Forces.190 
Only one week after the Houthis attacked HSV-2 Swift with C-802 missiles, the 
Houthi forces ashore fired two cruise missiles (possibly C-802) on the Guided Missile 
Destroyer (DDG-87) USS Mason and Afloat Staging Base (AFSB(I)-15) USS Ponce while 
both were transiting north of the Bab el Mandab straits.191 The crew of the USS Mason 
took “immediate defensive measures” by firing two standard Missiles-2 (SM-2) and one 
evolved Sea sparrow Missile, shielding itself and the USS Ponce from attack.192 Along 
with firing three missiles, the USS Mason also deployed its Nulka anti-ship missile 
decoy.193 According to then Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert, the 
defensive employment of missiles and Nulka by the Mason was the first time the U.S. Navy 
has utilized these weapons, as intended, in a real-world combat engagement.194 The attacks 
on the USS Mason (see Figure 13) and USS Ponce (see Figure 14) have been attributed to 
the Houthis retaliation for coalition airstrikes in Yemen, which killed more than 140 people 
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and injured 500 more.195 The Houthis claimed that these airstrike were careless and 
unmerited since they hit a funeral reception hall where only a few prominent Houthi leaders 
had gathered with hundreds of innocent mourners.196 
Figure 13.  USS Mason (DDG-87) Fires an SM-2 during a March 2016 
Exercise.197 
Figure 14. FA Float Forward Staging Base (Interim) USS Ponce (AFSB(I)-
15) on April 11, 2016.198
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Beginning on December 18, 2017, the Houthis commenced an increase in their 
ballistic missile launches, marked with a launch on the Saudi capital of Riyadh.199 The 
target was the royal palace, but the attached was not successful due to Saudis claimed 
interception of the missile before reaching its target.200 Within ten days of the launch 
against Saudi royal palace in Riyadh, the Houthis fired on Al-Ruwik military base, east of 
the city of Marib.201 The attack coincided with the base visit of Yemen’s Vice President 
Ali-Mohsen al-Ahmar. The missile did not achieve its target, but landed in close proximity 
to the base. 
Becoming more confident in their shore-based capabilities and demonstrating their 
potential at striking targets at sea, the Houthis attacked a UAE Frigate on July 29, 2017.202 
The Houthis, describing themselves as the “Yemeni Navy,” publicly took responsibility 
for the attack near the Port city of Mocha.203 The Houthis fired a missile attack from the 
coast, which was most likely a C-802, against a UAE frigate heavily loaded with weapons 
and ammunition.204 A coalition helicopter assisted the frigate and extinguished the 
inflamed ship.205 Unfortunately, 12 sailors were killed and over 24 were injured during the 
attacks.206  
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Marking the new year, the Houthis fired upon the Saudi border province of Najran 
on January 11, 2018.207 The primary target was a Saudi military airport, which provided 
the Saudi support for its special forces and Apache helicopters.208 No damage occurred 
since the Saudis missile air defense intercepted the missile over Najran.209 
On January 30, 2018, the Houthis fired a long-range Burkan-2 ballistic missile.210 
Targeting King Khaled International Airport, North of the Saudi capital of Riyadh, the 
Houthis displayed their relentless effort to strike Saudi targets. This attack triggered the 
Saudis blockade of all of Yemen’s aid and provisions from air, land, and sea.211 
The Houthis continued their ballistic missile launches against Saudi Arabia, 
claiming they were “in response to Saudi coalition aggression against the Yemeni 
people.”212 On April 8, 2018, the Houthi forces launched a Bader-1 ballistic missile against 
the Saudi radar base in the Ansir region and Khamis Mashet area.213 With a promise by the 
Houthis to continue launching more missiles at Saudi targets, the targeting of military bases 
could be seen as an attempt to degrade the Saudi air defense capability. Saudi Arabia has 
not announced whether the Houthis were successful in reaching their target.214 
The Saudis continue to succeed in defending against Houthi missile attacks as their 
Patriot Missile system proves to be very capable even when utilized outside of Saudi 
borders. On April 15, 2018, the Houthis fired two ballistic missiles on pro-government 
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bases in the city of Mocha, Yemen.215 Saudi-led coalition Patriot Missile Defense system 
was successful in eliminating the two missiles prior to them reaching their desired target.216 
May 2018 continued to be an aggressive month for the Houthis as they openly fired 
against the southern Jazan on May 15, 2018217 and again against the Saudi radar base in 
Khamis Mushait area within the Ansir region.218 The Saudis claimed the attack on May 15 
was successfully intercepted, possibly aimed at innocent civilians and possibly at the 
Aramco oil facilities.219 The attack on May 19, which utilized a Bader-1, received 
conflicting reports from the Houthis and Saudis.220 The Saudis claimed to have successfully 
intercepted the two missiles prior to reaching their targets while the Houthis publicly 
claimed that they had been successful in reaching their targets.221 
The ship types being attacked by the Houthis seem to be very diverse but aimed 
toward destroying Saudi military and economic infrastructure. On June 19, 2018, the 
Saudis intercepted another ballistic missile fired by Houthi forces, which was once again 
targeted at the Aramco facilities in the Ansir region.222 This recent attack marks a target 
trend that the Houthis seem to maintain. The Houthis consistent targeting further supports 
their desire to reduce Saudi Arabia’s capability of air defense. 
D. CONSEQUENCES OF THE HOUTHI THREAT IN THE RED SEA 
The various maritime tactics utilized by the Houthis in the Red Sea is causing 
disruptions in critical global trade markets. On July 30, 2018, Saudi Arabia announced that 
it would suspend all shipments of crude oil from traveling through Bab el Mandab and into 
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the Red Sea.223 The single reason for diverting Saudi oil shipments is directly due to the 
Houthi threat in the Red Sea region. Saudi ships, which have been redirected around the 
southern tip of Africa, have reduced the oil supply to Europe and the United States by an 
estimated 4.8 million barrels per day.224  
On August 4, 2018, Saudi Arabia announced it would resume its crude oil 
shipments through the Bab el Mandab and the Red Sea.225 The Saudi Minister of Energy 
Khalid al Falih stated that “the decision to resume oil through the strait Bab el Mandab was 
made after leadership of the coalition took the necessary measures to protect coalition 
ships.”226 These measures simply consist of coalition military escort for coalition shipping 
traveling through the Red Sea region. Although measures have been taken to protect 
coalition ships, this has not changed the Houthis strategy of disrupting transport and 
international trade.227 Abu Khaleel, the Houthi head of security, stated in August 2018, that 
“the reality cannot be denied … the UAE and its supporters, the U.S., and Israel, know that 
we have the capability to attack.”228 As the Houthis continue to boast that they can 
completely block Bab el Mandab whenever they desire, the strategy of coalition military 
forces providing security escort to vessels traveling through the Red Sea does not deliver 
a long-term solution. Since over thirty percent of the world’s oil supply travels through the 
Bab el Mandab, which only measures twenty-nine kilometers at its narrowest point, Shaul 
Shay argues that “the current threat to maritime traffic in the strategic Bab el Mandab strait 
demands an increased presence and involvement of U.S. and other western naval forces in 
the area, not only to guard shipping lanes and to enforce naval blockade, but to destroy the 
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Houthi anti-ship missiles and to deter Iran from direct and indirect intervention in Yemen 
and the Red Sea region.”229 
E. CONCLUSION  
This chapter discussed the motivations, capabilities, and impacts from Houthi 
maritime insurgency in the Red Sea region’s maritime domain. Through the utilization of 
fast boats, UMVBIED drone boats, and ballistic missiles, the Houthis have proven their 
capability to destabilize and continually degrade the safety and freedom of navigation 
through the Red Sea region. The Houthis aim to coerce the U.S. and coalition partners into 
a resolution for the war in Yemen. The next chapter discusses the components of the 
CENTCOM’s strategy and maritime response to the Houthi threat. 
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IV. THE U.S. RESPONSE 
While Chapter III detailed the Houthi impacts on the maritime domain, this chapter 
provides an overview of the U.S. Central Command’s (CENTCOM) strategy in the Middle 
East to inquire whether this strategy would benefit from a greater focus on the Houthi 
maritime insurgency off the coast of Yemen. CENTCOM has stated that one of its primary 
objectives in the region is to maintain freedom of navigation in the Red Sea Region and 
Persian Gulf,230 but the imbalance of priorities dominated by efforts in Afghanistan has 
prevented a stronger U.S. balance of power in the region. As the imbalance continues, the 
Houthis are likely to remain a threat to the freedom of maritime navigation in the Bab-Al 
Mandeb and the Red Sea in general. Chapter IV first examines the CENTCOM response 
to the Houthis and AQAP, then the counter-Iran strategy and CENTCOM success.  
A. U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND RESPONSE 
CENTCOM commander General Joseph L. Votel has described the combatant 
command’s area of responsibility (AOR) as “a theater primarily focused on maritime 
operations due to its three primary maritime chokepoints.”231 Two of these chokepoints lie 
within the Red Sea region, the Suez Canal and Bab al Mandeb (see Figure 15).  
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Figure 15. CENTCOM Map.232 
a. Regional Strategy 
CENTCOM’s strategy for achieving U.S. foreign policy interests in the region is 
designed to realize three main objectives.233 First, CENTCOM has emphasized the need to 
support the Trump administration’s objectives in Afghanistan.234 Second, CENTCOM will 
continue to provide U.S. military forces and support Coalition partners against non-state 
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actors in the region.235 Finally, CENTCOM is countering Iran’s destabilizing activities 
across the region since Iran has been recognized for covertly contributing to groups like 
Hezbollah and the Houthis.236 Since CENTCOM has placed maritime operations as its 
primary focus, the Houthi threat in the Red Sea should be highlighted in CENTCOM’s 
objectives. This is not the case, perhaps due in part to the overshadowing commitment in 
Afghanistan. 
b. Is Afghanistan a Distraction? 
CENTCOM’s role in the region is directed by the Trump administration’s foreign 
policy. The Trump administration’s strategy, which has focused CENTCOM’s resources 
in Afghanistan, is a continuation of U.S. post-9/11 policy on countering violent 
extremism.237 Previously known as the Global war on Terror, the effort to counter violent 
extremism has caused CENTCOM to continue centering its counterinsurgency strategy in 
Afghanistan.   
CENTCOM’s required support for the administration’s strategy has been attributed 
to the war in Afghanistan reaching its 18th year of operation.238 Announced August 21, 
2017, the Trump administration’s foreign policy in Afghanistan is very broad and does not 
clearly identify the benchmarks of mission accomplishment in the region.239 The general 
goal of the policy is the defeat of terrorism in the state.240 The administration has identified 
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twenty active foreign terrorist organizations that it has targeted as a threat to U.S. national 
interests.241  
CENTCOM’s role in the region is geared towards counter-terrorism in 
Afghanistan, but also focuses on Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Islamic State 
(AQAP).242 Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), CENTCOM’s leading counter-terror 
operation, has focused on countering the Islamic State and occupied areas of Iraq and 
Syria.243 Along with U.S. and coalition naval forces positioned in the Persian Gulf and 
Mediterranean Sea supporting OIR, the United States has maintained a ground force 
element in Iraq and Syria to maintain stability in the area and prevent insurgent groups 
from recapturing territory.244 
Since CENTCOM has been tasked with operations in Afghanistan and counter-
insurgency against Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, it has been strained in order to maintain 
a permanently forward deployed force across multiple fronts.245 The threats presented by 
these insurgent groups do pose risks to coalition partners in the region, and do have an 
impact on regional stability, but this may be shadowing the need to take direct action 
against the maritime instability that the Houthis have created.  
c. Primary Non-state Actor Targets
U.S. policy in Yemen is treading a line between defeating violent extremist 
organizations while avoiding direct confrontation with its coalition partners’ enemy, the 
Houthis. The Pentagon has stated that it is directly targeting AQAP but has not allowed 
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CENTCOM to directly engage any Houthi forces.246 CENTCOM’s primary strategy to 
counter the Houthi threat is by supporting coalition partners, UAE and Saudi Arabia, to 
maintain a favorable influence on the region.247 According to General Votel, the primary 
objective in Yemen is to “ensure nations in close proximity to Yemen are able to secure 
their border and safeguard their populations, while negotiations lead to secession of 
hostilities between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia.”248 To directly target AQAP, 
CENTCOM has a small number of troops in Yemen. According to the Pentagon, this small 
contingent has not been authorized to offensively engage Houthi forces.249   
The CENTCOM strategy of offensively targeting AQAP while supporting the 
Saudi-led coalition has conflict because of opposing state interests between Saudi Arabia 
and UAE. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have monetarily supported AQAP in the fight against 
the Houthis.250 Saudi Arabia and the UAE have solicited AQAP to join their coalition 
forces and allowed them to maintain a large stockpile of weapons, allowing AQAP to 
continue to grow in strength.251 Since CENTCOM is targeting AQAP in Yemen, and 
formerly recognizes them as a terrorist organization, allowing the Saudi coalition to 
continue their support is counterproductive to CENTCOM’s desired end result in Yemen: 
eliminating the AQAP insurgent threat. 
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B. CENTCOM COUNTER-IRAN STRATEGY 
CENTCOM has taken a direct role in countering Iran in the region, which is one of 
its three primary objectives. CENTCOM’s counter-Iran strategy has five elements: deter 
conventional Iranian aggression, bolster the U.S. network of allies and partners in the 
region, compete for influence throughout the region, maintain a persistent maritime 
presence, and thwart an Iranian-influenced proxy war.252 Iran has been described by 
General Votel as the primary source for instability in the region. Described by CENTCOM 
as the “Iranian Threat Network” (IRT), which provides supplies and training to insurgent 
forces in what has been described by General Votel as, “an effort to counter U.S. and 
coalition partners in the region.”253 The IRT is a network of regional alliances Iran has 
created with terrorist and non- state actors.254 Providing the resources to insurgent forces 
in the Levant and across the Middle East, Iran uses this support as a form of statecraft.255 
Iran likely hopes by supporting the Houthis, it can distract U.S. and Saudi efforts in Syria. 
In the Levant, by supporting Palestinian groups and Lebanese Hezbollah, Iran hopes to 
thwart any peace process with Israel and continue opposing the Jewish state.256  As a result, 
the IRT has been able to support the Houthi maritime insurgency and achieve its objective 
of increased regional influence. 
The IRT, or as described by Iran, the “Axis of Resistance,” is part of Iran’s grand 
strategy for regional influence and an attempt to counter U.S. coalition regional 
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authority.257 Iran recognized the opportunity for greater regional influence after the 2003 
invasion of Iraq.258 Following the 2011 Arab Spring, the destabilized Middle East gave 
way for a “new regional political and security architecture (figure 16).”259 This provided 
Iran with the opportunity to spread its influence across the region. 
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Figure 16. CSIS October 2018260 
The Axis of Resistance has evolved today to focus more on Iranian-led alliances 
and less on proxy sustenance.261 Iran has deployed its Qods force, or special operations 
units, to train and advise non-state actors.262 Hezbollah, being one of the largest recipients 
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and strongest alliance of the Axis of Resistance, has in turn taken an advisory role to the 
Houthis.263  
Iran’s direct support for the Houthis is monitored and assessed by the U.S. 
Department of State. Since 2012, the department estimates that Iran has spent over sixteen 
billion dollars aiding non-state actors in region including the Houthis.264 Also, the State 
Department has concluded that “the expansion of the Houthi maritime offensive 
capabilities directly reflects the persistent and malign destabilizing influence of the IRGCN 
in the region.”265 By October 2016, U.S. and coalition forces in the Red Sea region 
intercepted arms shipments originating from Iran and destined for Houthi forces in 
Yemen.266 Iran was found to be in direct violation of the UN Security Council arms 
embargo of April 14, 2015, which inhibited the arms transfers and military aid of the 
Houthis by Iran.267  
Countering Iran’s influence and its ability to sustain non-state actors is the most 
direct influence the United States has had in countering Houthi forces in Yemen. The 
United States conducted a naval blockade of Yemen to prevent Iranian military supplies 
from reaching Houthi forces.268 Unfortunately, the majority of the goods withheld from 
Yemen were consumables, resulting in hunger effecting over eighty percent of the 
population.269 On December 20, 2017, the naval blockade was suspended.270 Since then, a 
complete draw of the naval blockade has not been imposed, due to the Houthi’s 
unwillingness to concede to unconditional terms and their continued maritime 
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insurgency.271 A partial naval blockade has continued, which focuses on preventing goods 
from entering the Houthi controlled port of Hodeida.272   
C. ANALYSIS: CENTCOM’S STRATEGY   
Utilizing information published by the Congressional Research Committee and 
non-government organizations (NGO), this section presents three primary elements of 
CENTCOM’s counter-Houthi strategy to examine their effectiveness. First, the 
effectiveness of Saudi Arabian and the U.A.E.’s ability to target and eliminate Houthi 
forces has not been successful. Second, the U.S. and its coalition have not been effective 
in removing the Houthi forces out of occupied territory. Finally, the increased U.S. and 
Coalition maritime presence in the Red Sea has had a low impact on Houthi maritime 
insurgency. Although two of these elements do not directly incorporate U.S. naval forces, 
or involve Houthi maritime insurgent forces, the Houthis’ capacity to maintain a force and 
occupy territory directly contributes to their ability to conduct maritime insurgent 
operations. 
The primary state involved in air strikes to counter Houthi forces in Yemen has 
been Saudi Arabia.273 According to an April 2018 Congressional Research Service report, 
over 16,000 airstrikes against Houthi forces have been conducted since the start of the war 
in 2015.274 Amazingly, coalition forces have not established a process to measure the 
success of these airstrikes.275 Success in the case of these airstrikes would be to eliminate 
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the target Houthi forces while ensuring minimal collateral damage to the civilian 
population.276 
According to the UN Human Rights Office, Congressional Research Committee, 
and NGO Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), the airstrikes 
conducted by Saudi Arabia have been unsuccessful.277 First, the accuracy and target 
discretion of the Saudi’s has led to over 4,800 of the 16,000 attacks being carried out on 
non-military sites.278 The majority of Houthi-occupied territory is considered a non-
military site and requires Saudi Arabia to proactive better target discretion in order to 
minimize collateral damage.279 The U.N High Commissioner for Human Rights has 
identified these airstrikes as the “leading cause of civilian casualties.”280 Compared to 
Houthi forces, the civilian death toll in Yemen has been devastating. According to the 
ACLED, Yemen has suffered fifty thousand civilian casualties from January 2016 through 
July 2018.281 The majority of these deaths occurred in the first nine months of the conflict, 
described as the deadliest.282 
The Houthis continue to control and govern the majority of Yemen. CENTCOM 
has placed ground forces in Yemen, but are not authorized to engage Houthi forces and are 
strictly to provide training and security to Saudi forces. Due to the Saudi’s ineffective 
ground forces, they have continued to sustain heavy losses and have been unsuccessful in 
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removing Houthi occupation.283 Since February 2015, to date (November 14, 2018), the 
Houthis still maintain a strong hold over the majority of Yemen.284 This territory spans 
from the northern border of Yemen to the second most southern province of Taiz.285 
Unaffected from the east, the Houthis have held continuous control of over sixty percent 
of Yemen’s Red Sea coastline, including the strategic port of Hodeida (see Figure 16).286  
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Figure 17. Territory Map Yemen.287 
Due to the increased maritime threat posed by the Houthis, CENTCOM responded 
by increasing its naval presence in the Red Sea region.288 Beginning in February 2017, 
additional (varying between 1–2) destroyers were tasked to patrol the Red Sea waters along 
a 1400 nautical mile route.289 U.S. Naval destroyers carry a compliment of anti-air and 
anti-ship missiles, capable of defense against Houthi attack, but their primary role in the 
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Red Sea region was to provide coalition partners with maritime security.290 The secondary 
role of these destroyers is to prevent the smuggling of Iranian military arms and aid to the 
Houthi.291 
The U.S. Navy and coalition forces have had some success in intercepting Iranian 
goods destined for Houthi forces. As the rate of interception continues to increase, each 
interception brings large cashes of weapons. For example, on August 31, 2018, Guided 
Missile Destroyer USS Jason Dunham intercepted an Iranian-made dhow carrying over 
1000 weapons; the majority of these were AK-47 rifles.292  
D. BALANCE VERSUS DOMINANCE 
The CENTCOM strategy in the Middle East has focused on dominance rather than 
balance. The overwhelming and eighteen-year war in Afghanistan distracts from other 
regional priorities. Rather than approaching the region with the expectation of completely 
eliminating all targeting threats in a specific state like Afghanistan, and in doing so 
focusing efforts in that state, a strategy of regional balance of power may prove to be more 
effective.  
John J. Mearsheimer argues that the United States needs a new grand strategy on 
terrorism. The continuation of maintaining a forward deployed force in the Middle East, 
which he describes as a pursuit for global dominance, is not sustainable.293 Rather than 
pursuing global dominance, Mearsheimer states, “offshore balancing costs considerably 
less…allowing the [United States] to deal with the threats it faces in smarter and more 
discerning ways.”294  
Other scholars have criticized U.S. policy in the Middle East over the last decade. 
John Morrissey, also an expert in U.S. grand strategy, attributes CENTCOM’s present 
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strategy as a continuation of the Carter Doctrine.295 Morrissey states that, “for the past 30 
years, CENTCOM’s military strategy to secure the aleatory future of the most energy rich 
region on earth, has been one of forward presence, deterrence, and readiness to 
intervene.”296 This strategy has resulted in the “geo-economic shaping of the most energy 
rich region on earth.”297 Today, in an era of globalization, Morrissey concludes that the 
U.S. grand strategy has “caused CENTCOM to be the ‘neo-liberal capitalist world 
policemen.’”298  
Mearsheimer and Morrissey both have strong arguments regarding CENTCOM’s 
present mission focus. Mearsheimer’s global dominance theory explains why CENTCOM 
continues to focus on Afghanistan. After 18 years, economic and government stability have 
still not been accomplished in the region. Since Mearsheimer believes that the U.S. desires 
global dominance, the insurgent forces in Afghanistan have prevented the United States 
from establishing a sustained democratic government and economy. If CENTCOM shifted 
its strategy in line with offshore balancing, the resources required to sustain security in 
across the middle east would not be as constrained, allowing the U.S. to increase its effort 
to counter Houthi forces. 
Morrissey’s strategic theory of geo-economic shaping coincides with CENTCOM’s 
strategic focus in the region. CENTCOM has been tasked with ensuring the uninterrupted 
global trade of oil and petroleum from regional partners.299 Ensuring the three primary 
choke points in the region do not become constrained to maritime shipping is essential to 
the success of this mission. The U.S. support for Coalition partners in the fight against the 
Houthis has ensured shipping through the Red Sea has continued, but it has not gone 
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uninterrupted. If Houthi forces are able to significantly increase the threat level to maritime 
traffic in the Red Sea region, which would affect the trade of oil and petroleum, 
CENTCOM would need to shift its focus from Afghanistan to the Red Sea to counter this 
increased threat. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The required response to the Houthi maritime insurgency falls under the 
responsibility of CENTCOM. Due to the secondary role CENTCOM has taken in the war 
against the Houthis, the Houthis have continued to retain their force and occupy the 
majority of Yemen. CENTCOM’s counter-Iran strategy has prevented the Houthis from 
expanding their weapons capability any further, but this strategic element has not reversed 
the training and aid the Houthis have already received over the past decade. The current 
strategy, which relies on Saudi Arabia to eliminate the Houthi ground forces, has not been 
effective in removing the Houthis or eliminating the maritime threat they pose. The 
consequence of this strategy has primarily resulted in the devastating humanitarian crisis 
and the enormous civilian casualty rate in Yemen. The following chapter discusses possible 
solutions to the Houthi conflict and alternative strategies to maintain freedom and safety 
of navigation in the Red Sea region.  
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V. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis sought to inquire as to whether the Iran-backed Houthis have threatened 
maritime security and the freedom of navigation for U.S. and coalition vessels in the greater 
Red Sea region and, thus, to inform as to any potential need for the U.S. to change its 
strategy. The thesis found that Houthi aggression at sea has directly affected the maritime 
environment in the Red Sea Region, primarily for U.S. and coalition vessels. This thesis 
has supported U.S. naval operations in the Red Sea region, and CENTCOM area of 
responsibility (AOR) more generally, by examining the impact of Yemen’s insurgency on 
U.S. and coalition maritime operations.  
B. HYPOTHESES 
This thesis examined whether the U.S. needs to change its Yemen strategy by 
analyzing the extent of Houthi maritime insurgency in the Red Sea. The thesis primarily 
focused on the Houthis’ motivations for insurgency, how Iran’s assistance has elevated 
their capabilities, and the Houthis’ willingness toward and frequency of attacks as well as 
their capabilities and the U.S. response. The thesis presented three hypotheses. The first 
hypothesis posited that, as the Houthis expanded their combat capabilities and political 
control over Yemen, the threat to maritime operations would increase. The second posited 
that the Houthis did not pose a new threat to maritime operations in the Red Sea region and 
that there was no need for a strategy to eliminate the insurgent threat in Yemen. The third 
hypothesis posited that the U.S. Navy and coalition partners have sufficiently managed the 
growing Houthi threat, requiring no further action on their part. This thesis finds the first 
hypothesis to carry the most weight.  
C. FINDINGS 
Prior to 2014, the Houthis did not utilize maritime insurgency as a primary tactic in 
the Red Sea. The present unstable maritime environment is the adverse result of the Houthi-
Saleh alliance enabled by Iran’s support, which has resulted in the Houthis taking control 
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of strategic territory across Yemen. As of October 2018, the Houthis maintained control of 
over half of Yemen.300 As the Houthis maintain their presence in the Red Sea region, U.S. 
and coalition interests have been impacted. The Houthi maritime threat is not due to their 
ability to occupy territory, but rather from their maritime missile and VBIED capability. 
As the Houthis have expanded their combat capabilities and political control across 
northern Yemen, the threat to maritime operations has increased.  
A vital element of this thesis explained the core motivation of Houthis desire to 
conduct maritime attacks against U.S. and Saudi Arabia’s coalition vessels. The evidence 
that the Houthis have not targeted maritime vessels who are not involved in the war against 
Houthi forces in Yemen supports the idea that the Houthis’ primary motivation is to end 
the humanitarian crisis, end the war, and be officially recognized by the UN as Yemen’s 
government.  
As the war in Yemen rages on, the Houthis continue to threaten U.S. and coalition 
vessels. The utilization of manned fast boats, UMVBIED drone boats, and ballistic missiles 
have proven the Houthis capability to destabilize maritime security, especially by 
threatening the freedom of navigation through the Bab al-Mandeb. The Houthis have 
utilized anti-surface C-802 missiles against U.S. vessels like the Guided Missile Destroyer 
USS Mason and have relied on their VBIED tactics against Saudi Arabian oil tankers.  
 Houthi forces have resorted to maritime insurgency because they aim to coerce the 
U.S. and coalition partners into a resolution for the War in Yemen. Neither the Houthis nor 
Saudi Arabia seem willing to concede. Saudi Arabia refuses to negotiate an end to the war 
unless the Houthis are willing to withdraw from their occupied territory unconditionally. 
The Houthis’ primary goal is to become the government authority of Yemen, so they are 
unwilling to concede to the Saudis unless their terms for permanent authority of northern 
Yemen are met.  
The Saudi-led response of Operation Decisive Storm, and the coalition naval 
blockade of imported goods into Yemen has not been successful. The objective of the Saudi 
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response was to return Houthi-occupied territory to the Saleh regime and eliminate the 
Houthi military threat. The Houthis remain in control and occupy over half of Yemen, have 
maintained a form of government in Sanaa, and continue to display the capability to use 
military force against their opponents.  
The largest impact of the Saudi coalition response has not been on the Houthis but 
on Yemen’s civilian population. Due to Saudi Arabia’s imprecise air raid tactics, the 
already dilapidated infrastructure of Yemen has been obliterated. Civilians continue to be 
the largest casualties of the air strikes against Houthi forces. The naval blockade restricted 
food and supplies from entering into Yemen, which has exasperated mass famine across 
the country. Finally, due to the air strikes and naval blockades, the lack of medical facilities 
and supplies allowed a massive outbreak of cholera. Overall, the impact of coalition 
operations has been a humanitarian crisis. 
The United States, primarily CENTCOM, has not taken adequate direct action 
against Houthi forces. CENTCOM’s passive role in the conflict, and limited maritime 
assets dedicated to the Houthi threat in the Red Sea region, could be one of the elements 
that have allowed the Houthis to continue operating. The Trump administration’s regional 
foreign policy, which directs CENTCOM’s regional strategy, has focused on completing 
its objectives in Afghanistan. CENTCOM has taken an active role in the region to limit 
Iran’s influence, which, according to UN Security Council reports, has aided the Houthis, 
but the Houthis have already established military training and a cache of weapons. The 
training and weaponry provided by Iran is already being utilized by the Houthis, so the 
significant impact from limiting Iranian influence may not be seen in the foreseeable future.  
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis provides the three following recommendations for a change in foreign 
policy, U.S. Naval activity in the Red Sea, and Saudi Arabian air strikes against Houthi 
forces. First, this thesis recommends a shift in policy to provide a balanced U.S. and 
coalition military presence throughout the Middle East. The policy objective needs to shift 
from Afghanistan and properly distribute forces with a clear objective: maintaining security 
for U.S. allies throughout the region and preventing the rise of terrorist organizations. 
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While Afghanistan does meet these criteria of this policy, a more balanced regional policy 
could aim at objectives that do not require indefinite and unsustainable forward deployed 
forces. 
Following a change in regional foreign policy, this thesis also recommends a shift 
in U.S. naval presence in the Red Sea region. As previously stated, CENTCOM has focused 
on the Suez Canal and Bab al-Mandeb as high priority choke points that must not be 
impeded. The U.S. naval presence through these waterways should then be reinforced. 
Taking into account the limited maritime assets available to deploy, a possible solution 
could be the forward deployment of the newly developed U.S. Navy Mark VI patrol craft.  
Finally, based on the data of Saudi Arabian air strike accuracy against Houthi 
forces, discussed in Chapter IV, this thesis recommends more discretion from Saudi Arabia 
toward civilian casualties. Every air strike, regardless of the target, must have an acceptable 
limit in collateral damage. Saudi Arabia has not shown restraint in its airstrikes; it has 
accepted entire funeral precessions as collateral damage in the effort of eliminating less 
than three Houthi targets. Since Houthi targets continue to live amongst non-combatants, 
creating difficulty in efficiently conducting air strikes, Saudi Arabia should strengthen and 
reinforce its ground forces in Yemen.  
E. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
  Future research could focus on and be split into two separate research topics. First, 
since the threats within CENTCOM continue to grow and evolve, citing the Houthis as an 
example, future research could examine how the United States might best shift its regional 
foreign policy to properly control regional threats. A permanently deployed force in 
support of the continued war in Afghanistan is not sustainable and has allowed threats to 
grow in other areas of the region. Future research could provide insight on how to balance 
Afghanistan with other regional priorities. Future research could also focus on how to 
counter the Houthi threat within the Red Sea region. Should the U.S. assume a strategy of 
containment in Yemen? Should the U.S. Navy Mark VI Patrol Craft be forward deployed 
to the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden? The craft are highly capable and may be found to be the 
essential platform to tactically and efficiently reduce Houthi maritime insurgency.  
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F. CONCLUSION 
The undeniable threat in the Red Sea region against U.S. and Saudi-led coalition 
vessels cannot continue to receive the same response. The only clear result of continuing 
the current strategy against the Houthi maritime threat is likely to be a sustained 
humanitarian crisis in Yemen while realizing limited advances against Houthi forces. 
Crucially, as the humanitarian crisis worsens, the Houthis clearly intend to continue and 
even escalate maritime insurgency against U.S. and Saudi Arabian coalition vessels in the 
Red Sea. U.S. leadership needs to consider a revised response to protect interests.  
70 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
71 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
 Abdoufadel, Leith. “Breaking: Houthi Forces Fire Ballistic Missile at Saudi Radar 
Base.” AMN News, May 19, 2018. 
https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/breaking-houthi-forces-fire-ballistic-
missile-at-saudi-radar-base/. 
Aboudi, Sam and Stephanie Nebehay,. “Saudi Oil Tanker Hit in Houthi Attack off 
Yemen: Coalition.” Reuters, April 3, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
yemen-security-attack/saudi-oil-tanker-hit-in-houthi-attack-off-yemen-arabiya-tv-
idUSKCN1HA1RT. 
Al Jazeera. “Yemen: Who Was Ali Abdullah Saleh?” Accessed April 23, 2018. 
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/yemen/2011/02/2011228121189386
48.html. 
Al-Habib, Eshagh. “Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United 
Nations.” Official memorandum. Iran: Iranian Embassy, January 22, 2018. 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1GcS0FtU5FDqowTs7owVxdYJHuN9mPVvl/vie
w. 
Arab News. “US Military Release Video Showing Arms Smuggling off Yemen.” August 
31, 2018. http://www.arabnews.com/node/1364066/middle-east. 
BBC. “Saudi Intercepts Ballistic Missile Fired by Yemen’s Houthis.” May 15, 2018. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/2038632414/citation/9270D959BF164489PQ
/1. 




bin Hamad Al-Thani, Meshal. “The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia Are Aiding 
Terrorists in Yemen.” Washington Post. October 18, 2018. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/08/29/the-
united-arab-emirates-and-saudi-arabia-are-aiding-terrorists-in-yemen/. 
Binnie, Jeremy. “Yemeni Rebels Threaten Red Sea Shipping.” Jane’s Defense Weekly, 
January 2018. http://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/Janes/Display/FG_719429-
JDW. 
Brown, Matt. “Amnesty Accuses Saudi-Led Forces and Houthi Rebels of Possible War 
Crimes.” ABC News, June 22, 2018. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-06-
22/yemen-houthis-and-saudi-forces-hold-up-food-aid-fuel/9897684. 
72 
Byman, Daniel. “Proxy Power: Understanding Iran’s Use of Terrorism.” Brookings, July 
26, 2006. https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/proxy-power-understanding-irans-
use-of-terrorism/. 
Cavas, Christopher P. “US Navy Beefs up Red Sea Presence.” Defense News, August 8, 
2017. https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/idex/2017/02/11/us-
navy-beefs-up-red-sea-presence/. 
Center for International and Strategic Studies. “Axis Rising: Iran’s Evolving Regional 
Strategy and Non-State Partnerships in the Middle East,” October 11, 2018. 
https://www.csis.org/analysis/axis-rising-irans-evolving-regional-strategy-and-
non-state-partnerships-middle-east. 
Chughtai, Alia and Faisal Edroos. “Yemen Conflict: Who Controls What.” Al Jazeera, 
September 19, 2018, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2016/08/yemen-conflict-controls-
160814132104300.html. 
Cigar, Norman. “The Jihadist Maritime Strategy: Waging a Guerrilla War at Sea.” 
Monograph. Middle East Studies. Marine Corps University, May 2017. 
Colton, Nora A. “Yemen: A Collapsed Economy.” The Middle East Journal 64, no. 3 
(September 2, 2010): 410–26. 
C-SPAN. “CENTCOM Commander General Votel Testifies Iran Strategy.” video, 1:49. 
February 27, 2018. https://www.c-span.org/video/?441788-1/centcom-
commander-general-votel-testifies-iran-strategy. 
Department of the Navy. A Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century. Washington, DC: 
Department of the Navy, 2015. https://www.navy.mil/local/maritime/150227-
CS21R-Final.pdf 
D’Souza, Shianthie. “Trumps ‘new’ Afghanistan and South Asia Strategy.” Institute for 
Strategic, Political, Security and Economic Consultancy. December 2017. 
http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-
securities-studies/resources/docs/ISPSW-526%20D%27Souza.pdf. 
Egyptian Maritime Databank. “The Suez Canal: A Vital Shortcut for Global Commerce.” 
World Shipping Council, 2007. http://www.worldshipping.org/pdf/suez-canal-
presentation.pdf. 
EIU Viewswire. “Yemen/Saudi Arabia Politics: Houthis Step up Ballistic Missile.” 




Fahim, Kareem. “The Deadly War in Yemen Rages on. So Why Does the Death Toll 




Freeman, Jack. “The Al Houthi Insurgency in the North of Yemen: An Analysis of the 
Shabab Al Moumineen.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 32, no. 11 (October 30, 
2009): 1008–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100903262716. 
Himmiche, Ahmed and Fernando Carajal. Gunartne, Dakshine. Johnsen, Gregory. 
Wlkinson. Adrian. Panel of Experts on Yemen Report S/2018/68. United Nations 
Security Council, January 26, 2018. 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1GcS0FtU5FDqowTs7owVxdYJHuN9mPVvl/vie
w. 
Hokayem, Emile and David B. Roberts. “The War in Yemen.” Survival 58, no. 6 
(November 2016): 157–86. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2016.1257202. 
Israel Missile Defense Association. “Threats: C-802 Cruise Missile.” June 20, 2018. 
http://imda.org.il/english/Threats/threats_missile.asp?missileid=16. 
Juneau, Thomas. “No, Yemen’s Houthis Actually Aren’t Iranian Puppets.” Washington 
Post, May 16, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2016/05/16/contrary-to-popular-belief-houthis-arent-iranian-proxies/. 
Kalin, Stephen and Rania El Gamal. “Explainer-Why Is Saudi Halting Oil Shipments 
through the Red Sea,” Reuters. July 30, 2018. 
https://af.reuters.com/article/energyOilNews/idAFL5N1UP08T 
Karam, Joyce. “US General: Iran Achieved in Five Years in Yemen What It Did in 
Lebanon in Two Decades.” The National, February 27, 2018. 
https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/us-general-iran-achieved-in-five-years-in-
yemen-what-it-did-in-lebanon-in-two-decades-1.708639. 
Kerr, Simeon, and Anjli Raval. “Saudi Security Forces Foil Attack on Aramco Fuel 
Terminal.” Financial Times, April 26, 2017. 
https://www.ft.com/content/077cd4c0-2a97-11e7-bc4b-5528796fe35c. 
Kiger, Patrick J. “Pirate 101: A Brief History of Piracy.” National Geographic, 
September 18, 2018. https://www.nationalgeographic.com.au/history/pirate-101-
a-brief-history-of-piracy.aspx. 
LaGrone, Sam. “USS Mason Fired 3 Missiles to Defend from Yemen Cruise Missiles 
Attack.” USNI News, October 11, 2016. https://news.usni.org/2016/10/11/uss-
mason-fired-3-missiles-to-defend-from-yemen-cruise-missiles-attack. 
74 
Mearsheimer, John J. “Imperial by Design.” The National Interest, no. 111 (December 
16, 2010): https://nationalinterest.org/article/imperial-by-design-4576. 
Middle East Eye. “Oil Tanker Attacked on Key Transit Route along Yemen’s Coast.” 
June 1, 2017. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/oil-tanker-attacked-along-key-
transit-route-along-yemens-coast-690511801. 
Military Edge, “610mm Zelzal-2.” October 28, 2013. 
https://militaryedge.org/armaments/zelzal-2/. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Yemen. “United Nations Security Council Resolution 2216” 
May 31, 2018. https://www.mofa-ye.org/Pages/united-nations-security-council-
resolution-2216/. 
Misalucha, Charmaine G. “Southeast Asia-US Relations: Hegemony or Hierarchy?” 
Contemporary Southeast Asia 33, no. 2 (September 15, 2011). 
http://muse.jhu.edu/article/450063. 
Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance. “Saudi Arabia.” June 5, 2018. 
http://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/intl-cooperation/saudi-arabia/. 
Mohseni, Payam and Hussein Kalout. “Iran’s Axis of Resistance Rises.” Foreign Affairs, 
January 24, 2017. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2017-01-24/irans-
axis-resistance-rises. 
Moore, Kirk. “Former U.S. Navy HSV-2 Swift Wrecked in Yemen Missile Attack.” 
WorkBoat, October 7, 2016. https://www.workboat.com/news/bluewater/hsv-2-
swift-wrecked-yemen-missile-attack/. 
Morello, Carol. “Terrorism Is down Worldwide, but State Department Says Iran 




Morton, Miranda and Katherine Zimmerman. “2018 Yemen Crisis Situation Report.” 
Critical Threats, January 24, 2018. https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/yemen-
situation-report/2018-yemen-crisis-situation-report-march-1. 
Morrissey, John. The Long War: CENTCOM, Grand Strategy, and Global Security. 
Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2017. 
——— “US Central Command and Liberal Imperial Reach: ‘Shaping the Central Region 
for the 21st Century.’” Geographical Journal 182, no. 1 (March 2016): 15–26. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/geoj.12118. 
75 
The National. “US-UAE Counter-Terrorism Operations on the Rise in Yemen.” March 
25, 2018. https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/us-uae-counter-terrorism-
operations-on-the-rise-in-yemen-1.715962. 
Northrup, Cynthia C. Encyclopedia of World Trade: From Ancient Times to the Present. 
Armonk, NY: Sharpe Reference, 2005. 
Owoseje, Toyin. “Five Million Children Face Starving to Death in Yemen, Save the 
Children Warns.” The Independent, September 19, 2018. 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/yemen-crisis-conflict-children-
famine-starvation-death-a8545666.html. 
Paraskova, Tsvetana. “Saudi Arabia Intercepts Houthi Missile Targeting Aramco 
Facility.” Oil Price News, June 20, 2018. https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-
News/World-News/Saudi-Arabia-Intercepts-Houthi-Missile-Targeting-Aramco-
Facility.html. 
Perez, Tomas P. “Yemen Situation Report.” Critical Threats, May 18, 2018. 
https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/yemen-situation-report. 
Picard, Will. “Senate Hearing and CRS Report Show Two Sides to Congressional 
Engagement on Yemen.” Yemen Peace Project, April 17, 2018. 
https://www.yemenpeaceproject.org/blog-x/2018/4/17/sfrc-vs-crs. 
Prime. “Attack on M/T Muskie.” May 31, 2017. http://www.prime-
marine.net/post/piracy-attack-on-mt-muskie/. 
Reich, Simon and  Peter J. Dombrowski. The End of Grand Strategy: U.S. Maritime 
Operations in the Twenty-First Century, 2017. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=n
labk&AN=1589149. 
Reuters. “Saudi Arabia Resumes Oil Exports through Red Sea Lane.” August 4, 2018. 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security/saudi-arabia-resumes-oil-
exports-through-red-sea-lane-idUSKBN1KP0B7. 
Rubin, Uzi. “Threats: Zelzal 2.” Israel Missile Defense Association, June 6, 2007. 
http://imda.org.il/english/Threats/threats_missile.asp?missileid=15. 
Salmoni, Barak A. and Bryce Loidolt. Wells, Madeleine. Regime and Periphery in 
Northern Yemen: The Huthi Phenomenon. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010. 
The Saudi Net. “Jizan City Profile, Saudi Arabia.” September 2018. http://www.the-
saudi.net/saudi-arabia/jizan/Jizan%20City%20-%20Saudi%20Arabia.htm. 
76 
Serr, Marcel. “Understanding the War in Yemen.” Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs 11, 
no. 3 (January 4, 2018): 357–369. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/23739770.2017.1419405. 
Sharp, Jeremy. Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention. Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Committee, 2016. 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43960.pdf 
Shay, Shaul. “The Bab El Mandab Strait and the Houthi Threat.” Institute for Policy and 
Strategy, October 2016, 7. 
http://www.herzliyaconference.org/_Uploads/dbsAttachedFiles/BabalMandabstrai
tandHouthithreat_Shay_19_10_16.pdf 
———. “The Houthi Maritime Threats in the Red Sea Basin.” Institute for Policy and 
Strategy, September 2017, 9. 
http://www.herzliyaconference.org/eng/_Uploads/dbsAttachedFiles/RedSeabasin
ShaulShay25_9_17.pdf 
———. “Iranian Rocketry in the Service of the Houthis in Yemen.” Israel Defense. 
August 21, 2016. /en/content/iranian-rocketry-service-houthis-yemen. 
———. “The ‘Missile War’ in the Arab Peninsula” Institute for Policy and Strategy, 
November 2016, 10. 
http://www.herzliyaconference.org/_Uploads/dbsAttachedFiles/ShaulShay20_11_
16.pdf 
———, and Rachel Liberman. The Red Sea Terror Triangle: Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, 
and Islamic Terror. 1. International Relations Middle East Military Studies. New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publ, 2007. 
Shepp, Jonah. “While Condemning Iran, the U.S. Contributes to Terrorism in the Middle 
East, Too.” Intelligencer, August 7, 2018. 
http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/08/iran-us-contribute-terrorism-middle-
east.html. 
Trevithick, Joseph. “Houthi Rebels in Yemen Attacked Another UAE Ship and That’s 
All We Know for Certain.” The Drive, July 31, 2017. 
http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/13068/houthi-rebels-in-yemen-attacked-
another-uae-ship-and-thats-all-we-know-for-sure. 
Torommah, Hashem. “Houthis Aim to Disrupt International Transport and Trade.” The 
Media Line, July 30, 2018. http://www.themedialine.org/news/houthis-aim-to-
disrupt-international-transport-and-trade/. 
Trump, Donald J. Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia. Washington, DC: The White 
House. August 21, 2017. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-president-trump-strategy-afghanistan-south-asia/. 
77 
United States Central Command. “Command Narrative.” August 29, 2016. 
http://www.centcom.mil/ABOUT-US/COMMAND-NARRATIVE/. 
United States Central Command. “Command Narrative.” October 3, 2018. 
http://www.centcom.mil/ABOUT-US/COMMAND-NARRATIVE/. 
U.S. Department of State Iran Action Group. Outlaw Regime: A Chronicle of Iran’s 
Destructive Activities. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2018. 
https://www.iranwatch.org/sites/default/files/286410.pdf. 
US News & World Report. “Saudi-Led Coalition Says Thwarts Houthi Attack on Oil 
Tanker.” January 10, 2018. https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2018-
01-10/saudi-led-coalition-says-it-thwarts-houthi-attack-on-oil-tanker. 
Votel, Joseph L. Statement of General Joseph L. Votel Commander U.S. Central 
Command Before House Armed Services Committee. United States Central 
Command, February 27, 2018. 
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20180227/106870/HHRG-115-AS00-
Wstate-VotelJ-20180227.pdf. 
Xinhua News Agency. “Yemen’s Houthis Fire Ballistic Missile at Saudi Military 
Airport.” January 11, 2018. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1986631539/citation/A9F712BCDE2041F4P
Q/1. 
Yemeni, A. “Saudi-Led Coalition Cannot Deny Presence of Yemen Ground Forces.” Al 
Araby, April 10, 2018. 
https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/indepth/2018/4/10/saudi-led-coalition-cannot-
deny-yemen-ground-forces. 




Xinhua News Agency - CEIS; Woodside. “Yemen’s Houthis Fire Ballistic Missile at 





THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
79 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
